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4                    German ordo-liberalism and the future of the EU 
6 
7 
8                                                                          Alan Cafruny and Leila Simona Talani 
9 
10 
11                                                                                                             Abstract 
12 
13                       Far from enabling France to enhance its power over European monetary policy, the Euro has 
14 
15 
16                        served to consolidate the Federal Republic of Germany’s primacy in Europe.   In this article we 
17 
18                        argue that German policies that have underwritten this primacy are determined not primarily by 
19 
20 
21                        the ordoliberal ideas of German state managers, but rather because these ideas correspond to 
22 
23                        the requirements of the Germany’s neo- mercantilist export model and the interests of its most 
24 
25                        
powerful  socio-economic  actors.   Germany’s  material/corporate  interests  –  and  its  
particular 
27 
28                        domestic  and  regional  predicament  –  throws  up  enormous  obstacles  to  the  abandonment  
of 
29 
30                        ordoliberalism and the adoption of the more expansive fiscal policies that most observers 
believe 
31 
32 
33                        are necessary to sustain the Eurozone. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38                      Key  words:  European  Union,  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  German  monetary  
policy, 
39 
40                        Ordoliberalism, Franco-German relations 
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42 
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45                       Introduction 
46 
47                                   
Two decades after the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) there 
49 
50                        can be little doubt that far from enabling France to enhance its power over European monetary 
51 
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52                        policy the Euro has served to consolidate the Federal Republic of Germany’s primacy in Europe. 
53 
54 
55                        Germany’s extraordinary rise to virtually unchallenged leadership over the EU has been most
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 For Peer Review 
 
38 
Critical Sociology Page 2 of 21
 
 
1 
2 
3                          visible—and notorious-- in former Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schauble’s management of the 
4 
5 
6                          Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, not least during the negotiations over the draconian third bailout 
7 
8                          package with the Syriza-led government in Greece during the summer of 2015. 
9 
10 
11                                     Following the fashionable approach of “constructivism” in EU studies (McNamara 1999), 
12 
13                        the  “power  of  ideas”  has  been  most  commonly  invoked  to  explain  German  policy  and  the 
14 
15 
16                        resultant imposition of ordoliberal doctrine throughout the continent.  The German commitment 
17 
18                        to what Wolfgang Munchau has characterized as “ordoliberal utopia” (Munchau 2018)—even at 
19 
20                        the expense of potential Eurozone instability—is thus assumed to be essentially discursive.  Hans 
21 
22 
23                        Bibow,  for  example,  assigns  a  “critical  weight”  to  “Germany’s  oddly  anti-Keynesian  views  on 
24 
25                        matters of macroeconomic policy”(Bibow 2017). Vivian Schmidt laments “the hold of old ideas 
26 
27 
28                        that can’t be dislodged because they are so fundamental to actors’ understanding of events— 
29 
30                        and themselves”(Schmidt 2014). Others attribute Germany’s ordoliberal policies to “vindictive 
31 
32 
33                        madness”(Lapavitsas  2015;  Flassbeck  2016;  Hodgson  2018),  “abysmal  ignorance,”  or  even 
34 
35                        Germany’s Lutheran heritage”(Ozment 2012). 
36 
37                                      
To be sure, ideas do “matter” and ordoliberal ideas have played a decisive role in all phases 
39 
40                        of  the  Eurozone  crisis.    Indeed,  ironically  ordoliberalism  has  defined  a  distinctive  European 
41 
42                        approach  to  the  global  financial  crisis  in  a  region  that  was  once  the  global  heartland  of 
43 
44 
45                        Keynesianism and the social contract.  Yet, there are several problems with the assumption that 
46 
47                        ideas—whether ordoliberal or otherwise—in themselves can explain the resilience of austerity 
48 
49 
50                        in  Europe.   Notwithstanding  the  strong  influence  of  ordoliberalism  within  Germany  and  the 
51 
52                        European Commission, the original European integration project served essentially to buttress 
53 
54 
55                        the “embedded liberal” order, and not destroy it, even in the area of competition policy, where
56 
57 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3                          widespread breaches of competition law were (and still are) observed (Buch-Hansen and Wigger 
4 
5 
6                          2010). As Perry Anderson has written, ordoliberalism was “a somewhat recessive gene in the 
7 
8                          makeup  of  the  Community,  latent  but  never  the  most  salient  in  its  
development”(Anderson 
9 
10 
11                        2009). Indeed the initial blueprints for EMU contained in the Werner Report expressed almost 
12 
13                        entirely Keynesian views.  A second problem for the thesis of the primacy of ideas lies in German 
14 
15 
16                        policy  towards  the  euro  itself.    Germany’s  pursuit  of  ordoliberalism  has  been  selective  
and 
17 
18                        opportunistic (Storey mimeo), as exemplified in France and Germany’s violation (with impunity) 
19 
20                        of the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2003 (Talani and Casey 2008). However, it is also 
21 
22 
23                        noteworthy that Germany responded to the global financial crisis by adopting an expansionary 
24 
25                        fiscal  stimulus  five  times  larger  than  that  of  France  (Storey  mimeo;  this  issue).  Moreover, 
26 
27 
28                        Germany’s initial response to the sovereign debt crisis was essentially designed to protect its 
own 
29 
30                        banks by Europeanising the problem (Thompson 2017; Talani 2016). 
31 
32 
33                                     In  this  article  we  argue  that  German  policies  are  determined  not  primarily  by  the 
34 
35                        ordoliberal ideas of German state managers, but rather because these ideas correspond to the 
36 
37                        
requirements  of  the  Germany’s  neo-  mercantilist  export  model  and  the  interests  of  its  
most 
39 
40                        powerful socio-economic actors.  German capital relentlessly pursues an export strategy that has 
41 
42                        resulted  in  a  current  account  surplus  of  8%  in  recent  years.   Export  prowess  is  reinforced  
by 
43 
44 
45                        production chains centered on the German manufacturing core but extending throughout 
central 
46 
47                        and eastern Europe and increasingly penetrating into the western Balkans and even the original 
48 
49 
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50                        “six.”  Although rightly described as a “geo-economic power” (Kundnani 2014) Germany is more 
51 
52                        properly characterised as “sub-imperial.” Whilst the Federal Republic was arguable the de facto 
53 
54 
55                        regional  economic  hegemon  from  the  mid-1960s  onward,  nevertheless  Franco-German  
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1 
2 
3                          leadership  provided  the  geopolitical  basis  of  all  of  the  EU’s  major  projects  and  treaties.   The 
4 
5 
6                          Franco-German accord signed with great fanfare in January, 2019 at Aachen on the 56th birthday 
7 
8                          of the Elysee Treaty is but a pale copy of the original entente elementaire, saturated with rhetoric 
9 
10 
11                        but lacking substantive Eurozone reforms.   At the same time, however, despite the increasingly 
12 
13                        vituperative rhetoric originating in the Trump administration, Germany is condemned to remain 
14 
15 
16                        tethered to the erratic American superpower. Germany’s material/corporate interests--and its 
17 
18                        particular   domestic   and   regional   predicament—throws   up   enormous   obstacles   to   the 
19 
20                        abandonment of ordoliberalism and the adoption of the more expansive Keynesian policies that 
21 
22 
23                        most observers believe are necessary to sustain the Eurozone.  The contradiction between the 
24 
25                        interests of German capital and those of many of the other member states makes it extremely 
26 
27 
28                        difficult to meet the developmental needs of the Eurozone as a whole (Talani 2017). 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33                        Permanent Crisis 
34 
35                                 The  authoritarian  neoliberal  policies  carried  out  by  the  Troika  essentially  reprised  the 
36 
37                        
structural adjustment policies that were imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 
39 
40                        much of the global south during the global debt crisis of the 1980s. Yet, as noted above, if the 
41 
42                        rescue packages for Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain were consistent with neo/ordoliberal 
43 
44 
45                        discourse, they were fundamentally about protecting French and German banks who were the 
46 
47                        recipients of the majority of bailout funds. Moreover, the adoption of harsh austerity policies in 
48 
49 
50                        response to the Eurozone crisis of 2010-12 shifted the burden of adjustment from the banking 
51 
52                        sector to the lower strata of society in peripheral countries.   By characterising the crisis of the 
53 
54 
55                        euro-zone as a fiscal crisis and not as one of competitiveness, EU institutions further constrained
56 
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1 
2 
3                          national fiscal policy in a period when, following the global financial crisis, it would have been 
4 
5 
6                          preferable to replace supply side measure with Keynesian ones, as Obama did — albeit modestly 
7 
8                          –  in  the  United  States.  The  resultant  harsh  austerity  elicited  condemnation  even  by  the  
U.S. 
9 
10 
11                        Treasury and IMF.  In 2011. No less than three years into the global financial crisis the European 
12 
13                        Central Bank (ECB) raised interest rates twice even as Europe experienced deepening stagnation 
14 
15 
16                        and  mass  unemployment.  ECB  President  Mario  Draghi’s  declaration  in  July  2012  that  he  
was 
17 
18                        ‘ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’ brought the most acute phase of the crisis 
19 
20                        (for the EU although not for Greece) to an end. In 2017 the member states of the EU collectively 
21 
22 
23                        returned to growth. The recovery has been especially pronounced in the northern countries of 
24 
25                        the EU. In 2017 Germany experienced its lowest level of unemployment (3.5%) since 1980. 
26 
27 
28                                        Notwithstanding  these  developments,  the  economic  crisis  in  the  euro-zone  has  not 
29 
30                        ended. Positive growth indicators need to be set against a long period of stagnation and even 
31 
32 
33                        negative growth rates experienced by many member states after the crisis broke out in 2009. 
The 
34 
35                        region’s  recovery  has  been  both  shallow  and  uneven,  and  the  return  to  modest  growth  
was 
36 
37                        
achieved mostly thanks to the start of Quantitative Easing in January 2015 when consumer price 
39 
40                        inflation for the whole of the EU was 0%.  The deb-driven decade-long global boom appears to 
41 
42                        be coming to an end. Since 2008 global debt levels have risen to a record high of 237% of GDP, 
43 
44 
45                        exceeding the level of 2009 (Bloomberg 2018). The U.S. national debt increased dramatically to 
46 
47                        $22 trillion as a result of the massive decrease in corporate taxes signed into law in 2017, even 
48 
49 
50                        as the Trump administration pursues an aggressive strategy of financial deregulation. The IMF 
51 
52                        has concluded that the surge in risky asset prices is reminiscent of the pre-2008 period. By April 
56 
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1 
2 
3                          were waning; Germany experienced negative growth during the third quarter, 2018.   Italy slid 
4 
5 
6                          into technical recession (Davies 2018). The structural problems of the Eurozone have not been 
7 
8                          resolved. 
9 
10 
11                                        The debt crisis hit Greece in May, 2010, leading to massive austerity as the price of bail 
12 
13                        outs and debt reduction.    During the fall, 2011 Greece experienced the full force of what has 
14 
15 
16                        aptly  been  called  ‘Eurozone  fiscal  colonialism’  (Legraine  2014).  Having  announced  plans  to 
17 
18                        conduct  a  national  referendum  on  the  Troika’s  bailout  proposal,  Prime  Minister  George 
19 
20                        Papandreou was replaced by a ‘national unity government’ of ‘technocrats’ led by the unelected 
21 
22 
23                        former Vice-President of the ECB, Lucas Papademos when France and Germany threatened to 
24 
25                        withhold  financial  support.  The  result  was  the  wholesale  restructuring  of  Greek  society  and 
26 
27 
28                        economy under the diktat of the Troika. By 2014, as a result of a series of bailout agreements, 
29 
30                        the  official  level  of  unemployment  had  risen  to  27%,  and  remained  at  20%  in  2018.  Youth 
31 
32 
33                        unemployment  exceeded  50%  amid  large  cutbacks  in  social  services  and  social  provision, 
34 
35                        including a reduction of the budget for health care by one-half and the dispossession of Greek 
36 
37                        
public assets.  The Greek Central Bank reported an exodus of 427,000 “young, educated’ Greeks 
39 
40                        between 2010 and 2016, mostly to Germany, the U.K, and the United Emirates (Kouvelakis 2018). 
41 
42                        The rise of Syriza reflected widespread disillusionment with the two main establishment parties 
43 
44 
45                        of  the  center-left  and  center-right,  the  Pan-Hellenic  Socialist  Movement  (PASOK)  and  New 
46 
47                        Democracy, and the inability of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) to elicit support for a radical 
48 
49 
50                        socialist strategy. In national elections of January 2015, Syriza came to power, in coalition with a 
51 
52                        small nationalist party, with 36.3% of the popular vote. Neither during the campaign nor after 
53 
54 
55                        forming  a  government  did  the  party’s  leadership  advocate  withdrawal  from  the  Eurozone.
56 
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58 
59 
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1 
2 
3                          Rather, it sought to achieve an ‘honorable compromise’ with the European institutions including 
4 
5 
6                          decreased austerity and debt write-offs through mass mobilization and appeals to the European 
7 
8                          left for solidarity. 
9 
10 
11                                        The Troika threatened to cut off liquidity to Greek banks if the government did not 
submit 
12 
13                        to all elements of the bailout program. Syriza’s bargaining power was very limited and there was 
14 
15 
16                        very little evidence of European solidarity. While only hundreds demonstrated in Berlin in July 
17 
18                        2015 against austerity for Greece; by contrast three months later more than 150,000 protested 
19 
20                        in Berlin against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Pact. In a referendum called by Syriza in 
21 
22 
23                        July 2015, 62% of Greek voters rejected a new, harsher bailout package. However, Prime 
Minister 
24 
25                        Alexis Tsipras and the Syriza leadership remained unwilling to exit the Eurozone, a strategy that 
26 
27 
28                        would   almost   certainly   have   had   massive   de-stabilizing   economic   as   well   as   political 
29 
30                        consequences (Fouskas 2017). Faced with the ECB’s threat to cut off liquidity, the government 
31 
32 
33                        capitulated   to   a   new   round   of   savage   budget   cuts,   tax   increases,   and   privatizations   
of 
34 
35                        infrastructure in return for an additional 86 billion euros. After expelling its radical wing, which 
36 
37                        
had  called  for  exit  from  the  Eurozone,  Syriza  returned  to  power  in  September  elections  
with 
39 
40                        35.5% of the vote, condemned to preside over continuing austerity. 
41 
42                        The Troika’s diktat applies not only to Greece but also to Italy, founding member and third 
43 
44 
45                        largest economy in the EU. In 2011 Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was compelled to resign 
46 
47                        under pressure from Brussels and the financial markets in favor of the ‘technocrat’ and former 
48 
49 
50                        European Commissioner for Competition, Mario Monti. As a consequence of the austerity faced 
51 
52                        by Italy under the technocratic governments of Monti, Letta and Renzi, Italian populism raised 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 For Peer Review 
 
53 
54 
55                        to power winning the elections of March 2018 (Talani 2019 forthcoming).
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1 
2 
3                                       The Euro-zone crisis can be conceptualized a crisis of competitiveness which affected in 
4 
5 
6                          particular  the  Italian  export-oriented  manufacturing  sector.  The  backlash  suffered  from  the 
7 
8                          establishment of the Euro brought an increased discontent among the Italian electorate. 
9 
10 
11                                    This was exacerbated by the failure to compensate the losers from the crisis due to the 
12 
13                        austerity measures identified by the EU institutions as the way out of the crisis. Equally, Italy 
14 
15 
16                        suffered a failure of representation due to the disappointment with the traditional Italian parties, 
17 
18                        especially Forza Italia and the PD which were deemed responsible for the outbreak of the crisis, 
19 
20                        in the case of the Berlusoni government, and for its austerity-based resolution, in the case of the 
21 
22 
23                        governments of Monti-Letta and Renzi (Talani and Rosina 2019). 
24 
25                                    The ensemble of the above dynamics led the Italian electorate to move to the populist, 
26 
27 
28                        anti-establishment offers of the Lega and the Five Star movement, which had clearly identified 
29 
30                        the origins of the Italian economic difficulties in the establishment of the Euro and in the Euro- 
31 
32 
33                        zone crisis. 
34 
35                                    In turn, their alliance, being a purely opportunistic one, is very unlikely to collapse any time 
36 
37                        
soon. Moreover, given the inability of the winning Italian coalition to turn their back to the EU 
38 
39                        
institutions  and  to  leave  the  Euro-zone,  for  reasons  too  long  to  discuss  here,  the  populist 
41 
42                        government is likely to try and keep their electorate by identifying in the migrants the scapegoats 
43 
44                        for  the  consequences  of  the  Euro-zone  crisis  austerity.  This  is  a  strategy  which  is  already, 
45 
46                        unfortunately, very clearly developing. 
47 
48 
49 
50                        
Alternatives 
52 
53                        Can the condition of crisis be resolved through the transition to a progressive European fiscal and 
54 
55                        monetary federalism within the framework of existing European institutions?  Can Germany and
56 
57 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3                          its northern allies be won over to Keynesian policies?   Given the widespread disparities within 
4 
5 
6                          the eurozone, there is general agreement that, at minimum, three fundamental reforms would 
7 
8                          need to be adopted: first, the establishment of an EU budget with the power of supranational 
9 
10 
11                        taxation could allow for counter-cyclical policy as well as an industrial policy. At the present time 
12 
13                        the EU budget is 1% of EU GDP, and national budgets are subject to strict fiscal controls. Such a 
14 
15 
16                        budget would need to be substantially larger, perhaps within the range of 5-7 per cent, as called 
17 
18                        for the in the McDougall Report of 1977. A second reform is the transformation of the existing 
19 
20                        European Stability Mechanism, based in Luxembourg, into a fully-fledged European Monetary 
21 
22 
23                        Fund  under  supranational  authority  that  would  allow  for  the  issuance  of  Eurobonds  and  
the 
24 
25                        mutualization of debt. A third reform is a genuine banking union along the lines of the U.S. 
federal 
26 
27 
28                        deposit insurance corporation. These reforms, which would require Treaty changes, would lay 
29 
30                        the  basis  for  a  set  of  additional  measures  including  corporate  tax  harmonization,  a  
financial 
31 
32 
33                        transactions tax, and a social chapter. The end result of these reforms would be a break with 
34 
35                        policies of internal devaluation and austerity in favor of a progressive fiscal federalism along 
more 
36 
37                        
or less left-Keynesian lines. Arising from within heterodox and Keynesian circles, these measures 
39 
40                        have been advocated ever since the Maastricht Treaty, most notably in EuroMemorandum, the 
41 
42                        annual report of the EuroMemo Group (Euro-memorandum 2018; Stiglitz 2016; Lapavitsas et al. 
43 
44 
45                        2012; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2015; Varoufakis 2017; Godley 1992; De Grauwe  1998). 
46 
47                                        As   the   case   of   Greece   showed,   reforms   of   this   scale—representing   
fundamental 
48 
49 
50                        challenges to ordoliberal “red lines”-- inevitably lead to confrontation with European institutions 
51 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 For Peer Review 
 
52                        and a northern bloc of member states led by Germany. Their realization would require either a 
53 
54 
55                        substantially  greater  degree  of  progressive  federalist  solidarity  than  was  achieved  during  
the
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1 
2 
3                          Greek crisis, or else a dramatic transformation of the very nature of German hegemony in Europe. 
4 
5 
6                          The former would entail at the very least a highly mobilized and pan-European labor movement 
7 
8                          while the latter would require a transition from German ‘ordoliberalism’, resulting either from 
9 
10 
11                        enlightened  self-interest  or  pressure  from  other  states,  most  obviously  France.  Yet,  at  the 
12 
13                        present time, none of these scenarios appears realistic. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18                        Franco-German Restoration? 
19 
20                                   The leading contemporary approach to Eurozone reform centres around a reassertion of 
21 
22 
23                        Franco-German leadership, a strategy premised on the ability of France to secure the conversion 
24 
25                        of  Germany  to  a  more  or  less  benevolent  and  at  least  bilaterally  shared  systemic  leadership 
26 
27 
28                        position. Following his victory in the French Presidential elections of April 2017 and the success 
29 
30                        of his political party En Marche in the National Assembly in May, Emmanuel Macron sought to 
31 
32 
33                        reassert France’s traditional shared leadership status over the EU that has been surrendered as 
34 
35                        a result of years of slow growth and mounting indebtedness. His self-proclaimed ‘Revolution’ is 
36 
37                        
essentially  disciplinary  and  neoliberal,  subordinated  to  Germany’s  ordoliberal  diktat.   Having 
39 
40                        achieved two decisive electoral victories over the Parti Socialiste, from which he resigned in 2016, 
41 
42                        Macron  has  sought  first  to  complete  the  domestic  exit  from  the  post-war  social  settlement 
43 
44 
45                        started by Francois Mitterrand in 1981: ‘I want to get out of the status quo that was established 
46 
47                        between 1945 and 1970 (Sylvaine-Chassany 2018).’ Sweeping reforms are designed to appease 
48 
49 
50                        the German Finance Ministry and, more broadly, German ordoliberal sensitivities and opposition 
51 
52                        to  a  ‘transfer  union’  (Chazan  2018).  Under  Macron  the  budget  deficit  was  reduced  to  2.6%, 
53 
54 
55
56 
57 
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1 
2 
3                          leading to the cancellation of the Commission’s ‘excessive budget procedure’ even as budget 
4 
5 
6                          minister Gerald Darmanin insisted that ‘The right deficit is zero (Sylvaine-Chassany 2018).’ 
7 
8                                          Macron has launched a frontal assault on the French welfare state and an increasingly 
9 
10 
11                        divided and demoralized labor movement. In November 2017, he used a ‘fast track process’ to 
12 
13                        diminish the authority of the National Assembly and pass a set of anti-union labor laws that are 
14 
15 
16                        more   far-reaching   than   the   El   Khomri   labor   decrees   of   2016,   deemed   insufficiently 
17 
18                        transformative  by  Macron.  Macron  then  challenged  the  French  National  Railway  Company 
19 
20                        (SNCF) unions, demanding reforms in all dimensions of rail services, including working rules and 
21 
22 
23                        pensions that have been described by Le Monde as ‘the biggest change for the SNCF since its 
24 
25                        founding in 1937 (Nichols 2018).’  Victory over the railway unions, and especially the militant 
CGT 
26 
27 
28                        (Confédération générale du travail), would reprise in France Margaret Thatcher’s decisive defeat 
29 
30                        of the UK coal miners in 1984, the subsequent defeat of the remains of the post-war settlement, 
31 
32 
33                        and the consolidation of neoliberalism. 
34 
35                                        Macron has appealed to a resurgent spirit of ‘Europeanism’ which, as noted above, has 
36 
37                        
historically  served  as  the  rhetorical  justification  for  neoliberal  policies,  while  
simultaneously 
39 
40                        appeasing   German   sensitivities   and   consolidating   his   domestic   standing   vis   a   vis   the 
41 
42                        Rassemblement Nationale (formerly Front Nationale) even as he seeks to challenge the German 
43 
44 
45                        fixation with ordoliberalism. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50                        German Hegemonic Transformation? 
51 
52                                    A  second  approach  to  progressive  reform  proceeds  not  from  the  logics  of  
progressive 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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1 
2 
3                          German   leadership.   Can   the   structural   interests   of   German   capital   accommodate   the 
4 
5 
6                          developmental and political needs of the Eurozone as a whole? Could Germany as a matter of 
7 
8                          ‘enlightened self-interest’ abandon its ordoliberal worldview and reprise in the Eurozone a form 
9 
10 
11                        of hegemonic leadership analogous to that played by the United States in the Bretton Woods 
12 
13                        system? After all, the absence of Eurozone reform has potentially massive costs for Germany. 
14 
15 
16                        Elite circles in Germany are well aware that Eurozone crisis is a ‘latent but chronic condition (Kluth 
17 
18                        2018)’ and that a break-up would be catastrophic. Not only would the failure of structural reform 
19 
20                        deprive  German  industry  of  an  undervalued  currency,  it  would  also  leave  the  Eurozone 
21 
22 
23                        vulnerable to future crises, imperiling the euro itself. By gravely weakening Macron, it would lay 
24 
25                        the basis for a resurgence of the French far-right.     Although there is plenty of support for this 
26 
27 
28                        scenario  (Blyth  and  Matthijs  June  2012;  Bulmer  and  Patterson  2013;  Bulmer  2014;  ‘Europe’s 
29 
30                        Reluctant Hegemon, Varoufakis 2013; Blyth and Tilford, 2018), there are reasons to doubt that 
31 
32 
33                        Germany policy towards the Eurozone going forward will be primarily a matter of ideology, and 
34 
35                        not power and interest. 
36 
37                                
Does the German state have the power and resources to carry out essentially left-Keynesian 
39 
40                        macro-economic policies necessary to stabilize the Eurozone? Germany’s incremental strategy 
41 
42                        of crisis management throughout bailouts and austerity has itself been costly for German public 
43 
44 
45                        finances,  although  not  of  course  for  German  banks  (Steinberg  and  Vermeiren  2016).  The 
46 
47                        Bundesbank   remains   liable   for   massive   contributions   to   the   Target2   credit   system.   The 
48 
49 
50                        mutualization  of  debt  via  the  introduction  of  Eurobonds  would  represent  a  significant  new 
51 
52                        liability for Germany. The establishment of a debt redemption fund – pooling debt over 60% of 
53 
54 
55                        GDP – would require significant new spending, which explains why Germany has categorically
56 
57 
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1 
2 
3                          rejected joint liability in the form of a genuine banking union. Germany’s financial liability could 
4 
5 
6                          also increase substantially if it were to accept a European deposit guarantee scheme, rejected in 
7 
8                          2013 as an act of ‘brutal power politics’ (Spiegel 2013) and perhaps even less likely under the 
9 
10 
11                        new  Grand  Coalition.  Significant  fiscal  expansion  –  now  prohibited  under  Germany’s  own 
12 
13                        balanced budget law – would increase debt and reduce to the ability to recapitalize Germany’s 
14 
15 
16                        weakened banks. The moral hazard implicit in Eurobonds would be likely to expand significantly 
17 
18                        the cost of these programs. 
19 
20                                        The growing strength of the right in Germany as reflected in the September 2017 
elections 
21 
22 
23                        greatly  strengthens  political  resistance  to  a  ‘transfer  union.’  Reacting  to  the  formation  of  
a 
24 
25                        MFS/Northern League coalition government that will preside over a budget deficit equal to 130 
26 
27 
28                        per cent of GDP, the German weekly Der Spiegel complained of ‘moochers in Rome.’ Matteo 
29 
30                        Salvini, leader of the Northern League, responded that ‘Italy is not a colony, we are not slaves of 
31 
32 
33                        the Germans or the French, the spread, or finance (Varoufakis 2018).’ In addition, Germany faces 
34 
35                        a  host  of  longer-term  structural  challenges  including  projected  low  growth  rates  far  into  
the 
36 
37                        
future, population decline, years of low public investment and productivity (Fratzscher 2018), 
39 
40                        and migration. Germany’s vulnerability is perhaps illustrated most vividly in its core automobile 
41 
42                        sector, challenged not only by Donald Trump’s threatened trade wars but also by technological 
43 
44 
45                        changes in automobile production that are reducing Germany’s advantages and working to the 
46 
47                        benefit of China (Bloomberg Business week 2018; Varoufakis and Gokay 2018). 
48 
49 
50                                        These macro-economic and other realities underscore the tremendous difficulties that 
51 
52                        Germany would encounter in seeking to implement a project of “benevolent leadership.”   The 
53 
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1 
2 
3                          as the central organizing principle of German foreign policy since World War II, as the German 
4 
5 
6                          economy has become ‘structurally reliant on foreign demand for its growth (Tilford 2010).’  Since 
7 
8                          the late 1990s, German capital has pursued a strategy of relentless cost cutting in support of this 
9 
10 
11                        model.   A   succession   of   reform   programs   and   ‘employers’   offensives   (Kinderman   2005)’ 
12 
13                        undertaken by both the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union 
14 
15 
16                        (CSU)  and  centre-left  Social  Democratic  Party  (SPD)  dramatically  decreased  unit  labour  costs, 
17 
18                        especially after 2002 in conjunction with the ensuing Hartz IV labour reforms.  Germany cannot 
19 
20                        easily   give   up   on   the   Eurozone,   which   allows   Germany   to   enjoy   a   structural   bonus   of 
21 
22 
23                        competitiveness because inflation differentials with the other members of the Eurozone run in 
24 
25                        its  favour.  The  strict,  anti-inflationary  policy  of  Germany,  a  clearly  ordoliberal  policy,  in  a 
26 
27 
28                        permanently fixed exchange rate system and the impossibility of competitive devaluations by the 
29 
30                        other members of the EMU allows Germany to progressively lower its prices at exports. 
31 
32 
33                                        At  the  same  time,  crucial  stages  of  German  manufacturing  and  commodity  supply 
34 
35                        chains—primarily geared to the assembly stage-- have been relocated throughout central and 
36 
37                        
Eastern  Europe,  thereby  enabling  the  German  export  model  to  increase  its  international 
39 
40                        competitiveness (IMF 2013; Gross 2013). The asymmetries of the EMU and these supply chains 
41 
42                        illustrate an “astonishing continuity in the basic structure of German capitalism (Germain 2017).” 
43 
44 
45                        They indicate the vast scope of German control over the European economy.  Germany accounts 
46 
47                        for approximately 25% of EU exports and 30% of European GDP. If the supply chains (which are 
48 
49 
50                        closely dependent on the continuation of the Schengen Agreement, allowing the free flow of 
51 
52                        commodities across borders) are taken into account, the figures are considerably higher (France 
53 
54 
55                        Strategie 2016). German primacy is reinforced by its position as the central hub linking Russian
56 
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1 
2 
3                          natural gas to Europe, a position it has thus far maintained despite massive opposition from 
many 
4 
5 
6                          EU member states, the Commission, and the United States. The ‘export mercantilist’ orientation 
7 
8                          that  has  governed  Germany  since  1945  has  only  become  more  pronounced  and  
qualitatively 
9 
10 
11                        more significant in the context of the Eurozone. In 2017 Germany’s trade surplus was 234b euros 
12 
13                        (compared to China’s 390b euros and Japan’s 140b). 
14 
15 
16                                        The traditional link between export-led growth and expansion of the domestic market 
17 
18                        based  on  increasing  wages  has  been  weakened,  but  it  has  not  been  completely  severed.  
In 
19 
20                        contrast to most other advanced capitalist states, the German strategy of outsourcing has served 
21 
22 
23                        to  strengthen  the  domestic  manufacturing  base,  as  primarily  low-skill  and  labor-intensive 
24 
25                        production  is  located  outside  of  Germany.  In  his  path-breaking  analysis,  Julian  Germain  
has 
26 
27 
28                        identified  a  ‘distinctive  complementarity  between  German  foreign  investment  and  
domestic 
29 
30                        production that sets Germany apart from its neoliberal peers and illuminates its austerity course 
31 
32 
33                        (Germain 2017:13-14).’ The euro has of course underwritten the extraordinary increase in its 
34 
35                        export ratio from 26 per cent of GDP in 1998 to 46 per cent in 2016, facilitating an overall export 
36 
37                        
surplus of approximately 8%. 
39 
40                                        By  2015  the  United  States  surpassed  France  as  Germany’s  largest  export  market,  a 
41 
42                        position it had held since 1960. But Germany’s ordoliberal export strategy has also generated 
43 
44 
45                        increasing dependence on emerging markets, most notably China (15% of the revenue of the top 
46 
47                        30 German companies is derived from their sales in China), but also in the European periphery 
48 
49 
50                        (Sonmer 2018). In the latter case, this involves a tendential transformation of the significance of 
51 
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1 
2 
3                          same time, German capital is deepening its ties with the Western Balkans, and especially Serbia. 
4 
5 
6                          The ‘Berlin Process’ and ‘Berlin Plus Process’ launched by Chancellor Merkel in 2016 are designed 
7 
8                          ultimately to incorporate the entire region within the EU framework (Colibasanu 2017). Serbia 
9 
10 
11                        and Montenegro have begun lengthy accession negotiations. All six have obtained visa-free travel 
12 
13                        and Stabilisation and Association Agreements. Heavily dependent on the German economy, the 
14 
15 
16                        Visegrad  countries,  notwithstanding  their  Euroscepticism,  have  strongly  adhered  to  German 
17 
18                        economic  policy  (Farkas  2016).  For  its  part,  Germany  has  sought  to  reduce  EU  pressure  on 
19 
20                        Hungary and Poland for violating EU policies on migration, refugees, and the rule of law. 
21 
22 
23                                        All this contradicts assertions that Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel is becoming 
24 
25                        the new leader of the liberal trading order. Germany’s current account surplus with most of the 
26 
27 
28                        rest of the Eurozone drains net savings from trading partners while imposing a logic of austerity, 
29 
30                        slow growth, and internal devaluation. For the past two decades the EU has grown at only 1% 
31 
32 
33                        per year; Italy has essentially stagnated as its economy is 5% smaller per capita than it was in 
34 
35                        2001. In the first decade of its membership in EMU, Italy lost 20% of its export competitiveness; 
36 
37                        
Greece and Spain experienced worse (Talani 2017:96). At the same time German FDI is a crucial 
39 
40                        source of capital for much of the rest of the EU; 50% of German FDI is undertaken in the Eurozone 
41 
42                        itself. This is especially the case for the CEE member states. The rise of German economic power 
43 
44 
45                        and the resultant conflicts of interests demonstrate that although there is clearly a European 
46 
47                        ‘business  elite,’  there  is  strictly  speaking  no  European  ‘transnational  capitalist  class’.  On  the 
48 
49 
50                        contrary, as noticed in the introduction, the interests of different fractions of capital in the EU 
51 
52                        are by no means identical (Cafruny and Ryner 2019), a factor that helps to explain the British 
53 
54 
55                        decision to leave the EU. While Brexit encountered significant opposition from the City of London
53 
54 
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1 
2 
3                          (James and Quaglia 2019), it is likely to serve as a means of deepening the neoliberal project in 
4 
5 
6                          the guise of populism and nationalism. Indeed, British ultra-liberals and extreme Thatcherites 
7 
8                          have  exploited  working  class  discontent  with  the  austerity  measures  these  same  actors  
had 
9 
10 
11                        imposed to rescue the British financial sector in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. In the 
12 
13                        absence of a Polanyian “double movement,” the model of British capitalism will need to develop 
14 
15 
16                        even further along neoliberal lines if it is to experience further growth. Thus it will thus likely be 
17 
18                        accompanied  by  a  further  reduction  of  corporate  taxes,  liberalisation  of  labour  markets, 
19 
20                        relaxation of environmental and other forms of regulation, and an even more substantial shift 
21 
22 
23                        from the manufacturing to the financial sector, policies that would be consolidated within the 
24 
25                        framework   of   a   highly   predatory   post-Brexit   U.S.-U.K.   trade   relationship.   However,   
the 
26 
27 
28                        experience  of  the  UK  is  unlikely  to  have  general  application.   Indeed,  the  UK  is  the  only  
EU 
29 
30                        member state that might be able to sustain its economy outside of the EU, given its growing 
31 
32 
33                        specialization on financial markets as its main competitive advantage in the new global division 
34 
35                        of labour (Talani 2018). The continuing reliance on the German market and (limited) financial 
36 
37                        
support, means that there is little likelihood that subaltern capitalist classes would prefer to exit 
39 
40                        the Eurozone in favour what would almost certainly be a resumption of regional monetary 
rivalry. 
41 
42                        In the context of the weakness of the European left, they are condemned to remain in what 
43 
44 
45                        Magnus Ryner has aptly called the ‘ordoliberal iron cage (Ryner 2015).’  The capitulation to 
deeply 
46 
47                        unpopular ordoliberal constraints by Syriza in 2015 and the Italian coalition government at the 
48 
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50                        end of 2018 reinforces this bleak conclusion picture. 
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1 
2 
3                                Given  the  asymmetric  nature  of  the  EMU  and  the  dynamics  of  German  manufacturing,  it 
4 
5 
6                          seems clear that the relation between Germany and the EU is one of mutual dependence. If, 
7 
8                          unlike the UK, the rest of the EU can hardly sustain global competition outside of the EU and of 
9 
10 
11                        the Euro-zone, it is also the case that Germany needs both the Eurozone and the single market 
12 
13                        to sustain its neo-mercantilist export model.  Indeed, one might claim that the current situation 
14 
15 
16                        in the Eurozone and the EU is a Nash equilibrium, where rationally all players are better off in the 
17 
18                        status quo, notwithstanding its dysfunctions and long-term dangers.   This points towards the 
19 
20                        continuation  by  Germany  of  a  policy  of  incremental  and  reactive  changes  to  the  economic 
21 
22 
23                        governance structure both of the EU and of the Eurozone. 
24 
25                              It is also possible that “irrational” forces will prevail, as the growing support for right-wing 
26 
27 
28                        populist and neo-fascist political parties in various EU countries demonstrates.  To give just one 
29 
30                        example, as noted above the new, populist/fascist coalition of the Lega Nord and the Five Star 
31 
32 
33                        Movement in Italy did not actually plan to leave the Eurozone or even fundamentally to disrupt 
34 
35                        the EU project, but rather has sought  to shift the blame for Italy’s problems on migrants. 
36 
37                        
Yet,  it  is  possible  that  in  an  increasingly  volatile  atmosphere  a  mixture  of  incompetence  and 
39 
40                        arrogance  could  push  the  Italian  government  to  issue  a  more  fundamental  challenge  to  the 
41 
42                        Eurozone or even to the EU itself.  Recent upheavals in France at the beginning of 2019 suggest 
43 
44 
45                        the possibility of an even more consequential rejection.  The repercussions of such a challenge, 
46 
47                        if it were to succeed, are incalculable but would certainly prove catastrophic, not last to Germany. 
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